The Family in Civil Society by Fineman, Martha Albertson
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 75
Issue 2 Symposium on Legal and Constitutional
Implications of the Calls to Revive Civil Society
Article 10
April 2000
The Family in Civil Society
Martha Albertson Fineman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Martha A. Fineman, The Family in Civil Society, 75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 531 (2000).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol75/iss2/10
THE FAMILY IN CIVIL SOCIETY
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN*
INTRODUCTION
The civil societarians claim the family as their domain, its
salvation as their mission. The family is a foundational concept-the
"cradle of citizenship"-which teaches "standards of personal
conduct that cannot be enforced by law, but which are indispensable
traits for democratic civil society."' Problems with the family,
therefore, are clearly seen as problems for democracy, justifying legal
and political responses. In recent years a number of civil societarian
groups have met, held conferences and hearings, and generated
position papers and calls for action in an effort to engage the nation
in a discussion of civil society. 2
I will address two reports which set forth the purported
diminished state of civil society and suggest proposals for civic
renewal: A Nation of Spectators: How Civic Disengagement Weakens
America and What We Can Do About It, prepared by the National
Commission on Civic Renewal (the "Commission"), and A Call To
Civil Society: Why Democracy Needs Moral Truths, prepared by the
Council on Civil Society (the "Council").3 There is significant overlap
in the membership of both bodies, which may explain the similarity in
analysis and in policy recommendations. 4 Of particular interest is the
fact that William Galston is both a member of the Council and the
* Dorothea S. Clarke Professor of Feminist Jurisprudence, Cornell Law School.
Professor Fineman also directs the Feminism and Legal Theory Project.
1. COUNCIL ON CIVIL Soc'Y, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS
MORAL TRUTHS 7 (1998).
2. The National Commission on Civic Renewal has sponsored a series of scholarly
working papers and created an Index of National Civic Health. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON
CiviC RENEWAL, A NATION OF SPECTATORS: How CiviC DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS
AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABouT IT (inside cover page) (1998). I am using the terms
"civil" and "civic" as interchangeable terms reflecting the idea that individuals live a secular
collective or corporate life.
3. See generally COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1; NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC
RENEWAL, supra note 2.
4. Compare COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 29, with NATIONAL COMM'N ON
CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 65-66.
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Executive Director of the Commission.5 Professor Galston has been
an active and influential advocate for policies encouraging the
traditional two-parent family. The reports evidence that he has
played a strong conceptual role in both bodies. 6
Professor Galston's position on the family exemplifies the civil
societarian approach. My basic argument is that his emphasis on the
decline of the two-parent family, evidenced in the reports of both the
Commission and the Council,7 operates to eclipse concern with social
and economic forces that are truly destructive of families regardless
of their form. Of particular concern in this process are the political
implications of civil societarian discourse, which is replete with
allusions to crisis and family breakdown.8 I am also troubled by the
way that civil societarians construct arguments using public opinion
polls as though the responses to certain questions by a majority of
those polled represented some transcendent "truth" about the state
of American society. 9 That "truth" then becomes the justification for
legal policy punishing some families and privileging others.
Civil societarians justify coercive action based upon opinion polls
that show that the American public agrees with their dire
observations about the family. 10 But the term "family" is susceptible
to a variety of definitions. In addition to the "traditional" family
populated by formally married sexual affiliates and their biological
children, family can be understood to include other couples-
unmarried sexual affiliates, whether heterosexual or homosexual,
with or without children. To some people, family may also mean
collections of people related by blood or kinship systems, sexual
affiliation not being paramount. Slightly different is the sense of
family associated with lines of descent-an intergenerational concept
of family.
There are other possible meanings of family, but the point I want
5. See COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOc'y, supra note 1, at 29; NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC
RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 65.
6. Professor Galston has also served as an advisor to President Bill Clinton and, as of the
date of this publication, is on Al Gore's election team.
7. See generally COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1; NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC
RENEWAL, supra note 2.
& See COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 6, 13; NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC
RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 5.
9. See COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 4-6; NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC
RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 23-36, 45.
10. See COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 4-6, 19-26 (discussing how the public has
responded to certain polls and outlining the Council's recommendations); NATIONAL COMM'N
ON CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing a study on public attitudes).
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to emphasize is that it is by no means clear what definitions
respondents have in mind when replying to opinion polls inquiring
about "the family." For example, agreement with the statement that
breakdown in the family is a major indicator of moral decline may
evidence concern with divorce and single motherhood. It may also
indicate concern with the breakdown of intergenerational ties
evidenced by the fact that adult children no longer care for their aging
parents at home, or with a breakdown in family discipline evidenced
by the fact that overworked parents (married as well as single) do not
discipline their children into civility.
In addition to definitional problems with the concept of family,
terms such as "breakdown" chosen by the civil societarians serve an
ideological function.1' Using "breakdown" to describe changes in
patterns of intimate behavior generates a sense of crisis, transforming
demographic information into societal problems. The civil
societarians have not merely identified an existing crisis for
democracy and called for solutions. The civil societarians have
constructed a crisis in morality, as well as for democracy, by turning
the evolution of the traditional family form into a primary organizing
analytical tool. Marriage becomes more than a legal category. It is
reconfigured into public policy and presented as the path to personal
and family salvation. 12
But marriage is nothing more than a legal category. The term
itself does not necessarily indicate how individuals are living their
lives or performing their societal functions. And it is family
functioning, not family form, with which we should be concerned.
The question is not what is happening to marriage, but how those
members of our society who are dependent are faring and what
institutional adjustments are warranted in order to address their
needs. By focusing exclusively on family form, these are the
questions the civil societarians never ask.
DEFINING THE PROBLEM-THE CIVIL SOCIETARIAN PERSPECrIVE
Upon reading civil society literature one is confronted with a
mass of assertions, assumptions and accusations concerning the
declining state of the nation, many of them unfootnoted, as though
beyond dispute. 3  Consider the following statement from the
11. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 5.
12. See COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 19-20.




During the past generation, our families have come under intense
pressure, and many have crumbled. Neighborhood and community
ties have frayed. Many of our streets and public spaces have
become unsafe. Our public schools are mediocre for most students,
and catastrophic failures for many. Our character-forming
institutions are enfeebled. Much of our popular culture is vulgar,
violent, and mindless. Much of our public square is coarse and
uncivil. Political participation is at depressed levels last seen in the
1920's. Public trust in our leaders and institutions has plunged.14
The Commission's report suggests that concern with the state of
morality in "American society is suppressing satisfaction with the
state of the nation... weighing down American attitudes as Vietnam,
Watergate, double-digit inflation and unemployment once did."'15
This is reflected in the passivity and disengagement of the average
person who is seen as lacking confidence in her or his "capacity to
make basic moral and civic judgments, to join with our neighbors to
do the work of community, to make a difference. 1' 6 In its call for
strengthening the forces of civic renewal, the Commission asserts that
there are roles for "[i]ndividuals, families, neighborhood and
community groups, voluntary associations, faith-based institutions,
foundations, corporations, [and] public institutions. 17
Perhaps, as is appropriate in a report of "civic" health, most of
the attention in the Commission's report focuses on an individual's
responsibility as a citizen."' And, as citizens, we are certainly seen to
be a much diminished group that
place[s] less value on what we owe others as a matter of moral
obligation and common citizenship; less value on personal sacrifice
as a moral good; less value on the social importance of
respectability and observing the rules; less value on restraint in
matters of pleasure and sexuality; and correspondingly greater
value on self-expression, self-realization, and personal choice. 19
civil society movement with regard to its positioning and consideration of the family. See
NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 2. Most of the major players in the civil
society debate were associated with the Commission. See id. at 65-66.
14. Id. at 5.
15. Id. (quoting PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, DECONSTRUCTING
DISTRUST: How AMERICANS VIEW GOVERNMENT 3 (1998)).
16. Id. at 6.
17. Id. at 10.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 7 (citing Daniel Yankelovich, How Changes in the Economy Are Reshaping
American Values, in VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY 16, 22 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1994)).
This seems to be particularly ironic given that the implications of current economic
arrangements on civic health are not seriously considered in the Commission's report. See infra
text accompanying notes 39-44.
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The Commission's final report concludes where it began "with a call
to [more responsible, old-fashioned] citizenship." 20
A major failing of the self-indulgent citizen described in the
report is the rejection of the institution of marriage, behavior which is
particularly significant since marriage is central to the civil
societarian's concept of "the family. '21  The family, labeled a
"seedbed[] of civic virtue," is viewed as citizen producing. 22 "Families
are crucial sites for shaping character and virtue, they provide vivid
models of how to behave in the world, and they help connect both
children and adults to their neighborhoods and communities." 23
The Commission's final report is very clear, however, that the
family at the center of civil society is a traditionally populated one-a
nuclear family. In fact, the Commission's conclusion about the
decline of the family is based solely on statistics measuring the
incidence of divorce and nonmarital births.4 The Commission's
report is full of assertions about the inferiority of the nonmarital
family's child-raising ability. The authors recommend that the nation
make a commitment "to the proposition that every child should be
raised in an intact two-parent family whenever possible."25 This focus
on form to the exclusion of other aspects of family assumes that form
determines function. It also provokes law reform proposals seeking
to make divorce more difficult and to deter single parenthood.
Further limiting the already narrowly focused vision of the
Commission's report is its lack of attention to how changes in
nonfamily societal institutions have affected the family and civic
health in general. At one point the Commissioners recognized that
"[a]lthough civil society is independent of state and market, it is not
unaffected by them."26 This insight was limited to a concession that
the norms expressed in public law and process "inevitably shape and
temper the values and goals" of voluntary associations. 27 There is no
recognition that policies and practices of both state and market also
shape the material circumstances and well-being of citizens (and
families), and thereby have a potentially profound effect on the
20. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 20.
21. See id. at 6.
22. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOc'Y, supra note 1, at 7 (stating that the family is one of the twelve
"seedbeds of civic virtue").
23. NATIONAL COMM'N ON Civic RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 13.
24. See id. at 24.
25. Id. at 13.




development of civil society.28
FAMILY FUNCTION AND FAMILY FORM-COLLAPSING THE
DISTINCTION
The Commission constructed an "Index of National Civic
Health."29 This Index, perhaps devised to suggest that there was some
scientific nature to its inquiry and fact-finding process, is asserted to
measure changes in civic health between 1974 and 1996.30 The
Commission established five equally weighted categories as relevant
to the assessment of civic health: "political participation, political and
social trust, associational membership, family integrity and stability,
and crime. ' 31 The "Family Component" contained only two variables
or subcategories within it--divorce and nonmarital births, which are
each equally weighted at ten percent.32
This narrow and exclusive focus on family form when addressing
the family within civil society is consistent with other polemical
writing on the topic. In its report to the nation, the Council on Civil
Society expressed concern with the moral state of the nation and
identified as the first of three proposed goals "to increase the
likelihood that more children will grow up with their two married
parents."33 The Council found proof of declining morality "primarily
in the steady spread of behavior that weakens family life, promotes
disrespect for authority and for others, and insults the practice of
personal responsibility." 34  The Council's report drew the civil
28. This second objection gives rise to some confusion in considerations of civil society-it
is not always clear who is in and who is outside of civil society. At one point the Commission
defines "civil society" as "meaning free markets and private associations," suggesting that all
nongovernmental institutions might be considered civil. Id. at 43 n.16. At another point,
however, "civil society" is seemingly restricted to "the network of voluntary associations and
activities." Id. at 39.
29. Id. at 23.
30. See id. at 24-25.
31. Id. at 23-24. Each of the five categories is weighted 20%.
32. See id. at 24. Ten percent is the same weight assigned to variables in other categories,
such as voter turnout and other political activities (Political Component) and trust in others and
confidence in government (Trust Component). It is more weight than was given to variables
such as the rate of youth murderers per youth population-6.7%-or survey-reported crime per
population-6.7% (Security Component). See id.
33. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 18.
34. Id. at 5. This use of the term "morality" is different than that in the report of the
Commission. The Commission's report opted for morality based not on "any particular
denominational creed," but on "the constitutional faith we share-in the moral principles set
forth in the Declaration of Independence, and the public purposes set forth in the Preamble to
the Constitution." NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 12. The Council's
report cites as indications of a weakened morality "behavior that threatens family
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societarian's typical causal link between nontraditional family forms
and social harm.35 Whether in the language of the Council or of the
Commission, the "disintegration36 or "breakdown"3 7 of the family
both evidences and causes further civic decline. Such breakdown is
synonymous with the trends in divorce and never-married
motherhood. 31
It is important to note that this breakdown is viewed as so serious
that it justifies the exceptional treatment of the family-treatment
outside of the general paradigm for the civil society. Both the
Council and the Commission express an image or concept of civil
society that focuses on its "voluntary" nature: its groupings and
associations are not established and controlled by the state.39
Nonetheless, as is clear from the Council's recommendations, its
conception of the family within civil society is a narrowly defined
legalistic model based on state-regulated, traditional marriage.
Hence, it suggests that no-fault divorce laws be reformed for the
purpose of both "lowering the divorce rate and improving the quality
of marriage." 4
Unlike other civil institutions, the family is not perceived to be a
voluntary or unregulated institution outside of state control. Quite
the contrary, the civil societarians want the family regulated not only
at entry into marriage, but also at exit from that institution, with
requirements of fault reimposed in some instances, such as through
the establishment of a covenant marriage model.41  The
recommendation of the imposition of a system of coercive laws and
cohesiveness," although it also notes that weakening morality was evidenced by "uncivil"
behavior and "behavior that violates the norm of personal responsibility." COUNCIL ON CIVIL
SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 5. Examples of moral decline includes "unwed childbearing,
extramarital affairs, [and] easy sex as a normal part of life." Id. Uncivil behavior includes
"[c]hildren disrespecting adults," "[d]eclining loyalty between employers and employees," and
"[tihe absence of common courtesy." Id. A pop star announcing a preference for single
motherhood is one example of violating the norm of personal responsibility. See id.
35. Id. at 18. The Council writes that "the steady break-up of the married couple child-
raising unit [is] the leading propeller of our overall social deterioration .... Id.
36. Id. at 6.
37. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 5.
3X See COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 18; NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC
RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 24.
39. The Council defines "civil society" in part as referring "specifically to relationships and
institutions that are neither created nor controlled by the state." COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y,
supra note 1, at 6. The Commission indicates that "the institutions of civil society are organic,
not mechanical, and can at best be nurtured, not engineered." NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC
RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 12. One would assume that they can not be legislated either.
40. COUNCIL ON CIVIL Soc'Y, supra note 1, at 19.
41. See id. at 19-20.
20001
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
regulation over the formation and dissolution is unique to marriage in
the Council's consideration of the institutions of civil society.42
By contrast, when considering what actions might be appropriate
for other civic institutions, the Council recommends lessening
governmental controls (that is, pass legislation to allow the media to
develop a voluntary "Family Hour" policy without fear of litigation
by the government). 41 Other institutions are not viewed in need of
coercive legislation or ongoing supervision in order to perform their
civic responsibilities. Business, labor and economic institutions are
"urge[d]" or cajoled into reconsidering priorities.44 There are no
suggestions for rules and restrictions for monitoring the operational
decisions of economic institutions.
REGULATING THE FAMILY-MORAL JUSTIFICATION AND BEYOND
In considering the justification for regulation of the family, it is
helpful to untangle moral objections to the non-nuclear family from
arguments asserting that there are harmful consequences to children
raised in such families.45 Morality is prominent in the discourse of
those concerned with civil society, but most supplement moral with
secular concerns. For example, William Galston46 made A Liberal-
Democratic Case for the Two-Parent Family, a widely quoted article
in the Responsive Community.47 He begins his argument by positing
the family as a moral unit that makes an "irreplaceable contribution
to the creation of... citizens ... possessing the virtues appropriate to
a liberal democratic community." 48 His tying together of morality and
family is followed by a reference to a Washington Post article
reporting the "results of a nationwide inquiry into the public mood." 49
Galston used the poll data and the article to conclude that "[t]he
42. In addition to reinstituting fault, the Council recommends that federal regulations
preventing school districts from discouraging unwed teen childbearing be repealed so that
schools are free to adopt disincentives (or incentives) on such behavior. Id. at 20. The Council
also suggests that preferences in public benefits such as public housing be established for
married couples. Id.
43. Id. at 25.
44. See id. at 24-25.
45. Conclusions about popular notions of morality based on opinion surveys may be
questioned, particularly if they are the basis for legal reforms with the potential to make people
unhappy and less prone to escape sometimes violent and emotionally abusive marriages.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
47. William A. Galston, A Liberal-Democratic Case for the Two-Parent Family,
RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter 1990-1991, at 14, 14.
4& Id.
49. Id. at 15-16.
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public believes [that] America is in the grip of 'moral decay."' 50
Further, the public's prime explanation of moral decay was reported
to be "the breakdown of the family." 51
Galston, apparently buoyed by the concurrence of "[t]he public"
in his analysis, deemed its characterization as "hardly the product of
an overheated public imagination."52 At this point, he cites statistics
on divorce and nonmarital motherhood, presumably as an offer of
hard evidence for public perceptions.5 3 There seems something
counterintuitive and confusing about this turn in Galston's argument.
He has imposed upon his reader the definition of "breakdown" for
the public responding to the poll-divorce and single motherhood.5 4
But if his assertion that these statistics illustrate the problem is true,
and it is also true that the divorce rate continues to hover around fifty
percent55 and that never-married motherhood is on the rise,56 then a
significant number of those responding to this (and other) polls about
the state of American moral health must be agreeing that their own
behavior is an indication of moral decline-is itself immoral.
I am much less confident that this poll means anything about the
nature of the public's opinion.57 The map of the public mind that
Galston seeks to draw is too uncharted to support his construction of
the moral family as exclusively the marital family. In addition, it
certainly seems that poll information such as this should not be
presented as evidence of the "truth" of moral decay.
Of course, as a liberal political theorist, Galston does not rest his
argument on morality alone. He recognizes that coercive rules have
the potential to "jeopardize a liberal democracy's dedication to a
wide sphere of individual freedom. ' 58  He concludes that "[s]tate
action must therefore be justified in light of widely shared public
50. Id. at 16.
51. Id. Galston also notes this position in his book. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL
PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 283-87 (1991).
52. Galston, supra note 47, at 16.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See TERRY LUGAILA, HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND CHILDREN: A 30-YEAR
PERSPECTIVE 8 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports P23-181, 1992).
56. See ARTHUR J. NORTON & LOUISA F. MILLER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND
REMARRIAGE IN THE 1990'S, at 1-4 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports P23-
180, 1992).
57. See THEODORE CAPLOW, AMERICAN SOCIAL TRENDS 63 (1991). Caplow questions
whether there is even a crisis of the family. Despite the fact that Americans have been told that
the family is in crisis, they tend to see their own families as happy and successful. See id.
58. Galston, supra note 47, at 15.
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purposes, and the line separating such public purposes from personal
moral preferences must be vigilantly safeguarded."5 9  Galston
undertakes a search for nonmorality-based public purposes for his
preference for intact two-parent families, such as economic
consequences and nonmonetary or non-economic consequences of
single parenting.60
Galston identifies the consequences of family breakdown as both
economic and non-economic, with the effects on children of particular
concern.61 The economic effects are well documented-single-parent
families are poorer than two-parent families.62 Galston suggests that
"[i]t is no exaggeration to say that the best anti-poverty program for
children is a stable, intact family. '63 One must wonder if he is unaware
of the many poor, working, two-parent families in the United States.64
While having two parents may increase the likelihood that a child will
not starve, it certainly does not guarantee economic stability.
Therefore, to label the intact family as "the best" program to prevent
childhood poverty seems glib and inappropriate.
Of course, if the problems confronting children were perceived
as largely economic the solution would be obvious-transfer
monetary resources to the child-rearing unit from one parent to the
other, or from the state to the caretaking parent. Galston identifies
other consequences for children living in one-parent homes that are
less susceptible to economic measures, however.65 He asserts that
there is an emerging consensus on the non-economic consequences of
divorce, quoting Karl Zinsmeister:
There is a mountain of scientific evidence showing that when
families disintegrate, children often end up with intellectual,
physical, and emotional scars that persist for life .... We talk about
the drug crisis, the education crisis, and the problems of teen
pregnancy and juvenile crime. But all these ills trace back
predominantly to one source: broken families. 6
Galston further elaborates by describing the conclusions of a few
studies to support his assertion that "the disintegrating American
59. Id.
60. See id. at 16-17.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 16.
63. Id. at 16-17. Galston continues, "[c]onversely, family disintegration is a major reason
why after a decade-long economic expansion-the poverty rate among children is nearly twice
as high as it is among elderly Americans." Id. at 17.
64. See infra note 128.
65. See Galston, supra note 47, at 17.
66. Id.
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family is at the root of America's declining educational achievement.'" 67
According to Galston, one study's lead investigator indicated that
"[c]hildren need authoritative rules and stable schedules, which
harried single parents often have a hard time supplying."68 Quoting
the investigator, Galston wrote:
One of the things we found is that children who had regular
bedtimes, less TV, hobbies and after-school activities--children
who are in households that are orderly and predictable-do better
than children who [did] not. I don't think we can escape the
conclusion that children need structure and often times the divorce
household is a chaotic scene.69
Galston explicitly recognizes that his preference for an intact
two-parent family does not mean they are always to be preferred or
that all single-parent families are "dysfunctional. ' '70 I presume he
would also recognize that quite often two-parent families are chaotic.
His argument is a statistical one directed at shaping social policy. It is
also explicitly moral or "frankly normative" argument relying not
only on "scholarly evidence, but also with the moral sentiments of
most Americans."'71 Speaking for "most Americans," Galston asserts
that
[a] primary purpose of the family is to raise children, and for this
purpose families with stably married parents are best. Sharply
rising rates of divorce, unwed mothers, and runaway fathers
represent abuses of individual freedom, for they are patterns of
adult behavior with profoundly negative effects on children.72
With this intriguing choice of emphasis, Galston joins the moral with
the statistical-the negative effects on children turn parental
behavior, in regard to marriage, into abuses.7
Galston advocates changes in law and policy, including a
"'braking' mechanism" on divorce and serious efforts at collection of
child support.74 As minor as those suggestions seem, the logic of his
argument is to lay the groundwork for more coercive rules. In
Galston's rendition of reality, family form is not only a predictor of
economic well-being, but unmarried motherhood is a proxy for poor
67. Id. at 18.
68. Id. at 17.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 19. He is also clear that he does not advocate a return to "the single-
breadwinner 'traditional' family of the 1950s." Id.
71. Id. at 20.
72. Id. at 21.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 23-24.
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organizational skills and individual immorality. 75
The purpose of this article is to provide the reader with
information about the civil societarians' positions and to criticize
what is missing from their analysis. Many other commentators have
clarified, elaborated upon, or challenged the empirical or "scientific"
findings of the effects of family form on children that are so
persuasive to Galston and other two-parent family proponents.76 One
example of such a challenge is a book by Judith Stacey in which she
commented on the process whereby the results of only some studies
(those supporting the family disintegration thesis) get publicized and
aggressively made part of public policy discourse through think tanks
and advocates with access to media. 77  Furthermore, evidence is
conflicting and new studies call into question the conclusions of the
civil society advocates that single parenthood is harmful to children. 78
In one recent example, a large multiethnic study from Cornell
University indicated that single motherhood does not necessarily
compromise preparedness for school, indicating that what mattered
most was the mother's ability and educational level.79
The civil societarians' emphasis on family form has provoked
responses from the next generation of scholars, indicating that their
assertions and assumptions are far from representing a consensus.
For example, in an interesting paper examining the causal basis of
communitarian family values (and Galston's work in particular),
Andrew Lister considers the empirical claims, concludes that the
evidence for the effects of family structure is far from clear, and
documents the obstacles that stand in the way of gathering such
evidence.80 Lister pointed out that mere associations, such as that
between single-parent families and poorer school performance, do
75. See id. at 16-17.
76. See, e.g., JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY
VALUES IN THE POSTMODERN AGE (1996).
77. See id. at 59.
78. See, e.g., Henry N. Ricciuti, Single Parenthood and School Readiness in White, Black,
and Hispanic 6- and 7-Year-Olds, 13 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 450, 450, 459-63 (1999). These two
factors (mother's ability and educational level) were found to be about the same in both of the
large samples analyzed of single- and two-parent families. See id. at 450,462.
79. See id. at 459-63.
80. Andrew Lister, A Family Affair: The Causal Basis of Communitarian Family Values,
Speech at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Sept. 2-5,
1999) (on file with the author). Lister considered Judith Stacey's charge about the selection and
exaggeration of only some social science information, finding a good deal of evidence of
exaggeration. See id. Lister stated, however, that the "best research" does seem to indicate that
growing up in a single parent family is not good for children. Id. Lister has reservations about
such "best research," however, and sets forth his analysis of the difficulties with such studies. Id.
[Vol. 75:531
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not tell us very much about causation. 81 Children in two-parent
families may graduate from high school at a higher rate, but children
living in one-parent households are less likely to have college-
educated parents and are more likely to be Black or Hispanic (hence
subject to discrimination and/or language barriers).82 If such factors
are not taken into account, it is impossible to determine how much of
the difference in school achievement is due to family structure and
how much to other parental characteristics. 83 Lister concludes that it
is misleading to focus our debate on scientific evidence about the
effects of family structure on children's well-being and suggests that
we directly consider the moral balancing involved in setting family
policy.84
In regard to moral issues, feminists raise additional points of
contention that are normative in nature, reflecting concern for
marriage's historic role in the subordination of women. Iris Marion
Young has questioned Galston's exclusive focus on children, noting
that a preference for marriage "amounts to calling for mothers to
depend on men to keep them out of poverty, and this entails
subordination in many cases." 85  Pepper Schwartz expressed her
disagreement with the arguments favoring the two-parent families:
"On what grounds could I possibly dissent? How about gender?
How about man's inhumanity to woman? How about thousands of
years of female sacrifice unnoticed, almost unmentioned? And how
about the family as the primary institution of women's subordination
and oppression?"86
It is important to see the extent of the difference in moral visions
between Galston and such commentators. While the proponents of
two-parent families seem to believe that parents self-indulgently
divorce with little concern for their children's welfare, feminist
arguments, such as those above, indicate that there are deeper social
problems associated with the institution of marriage other than the




83. See id. See generally SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A
SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS (1994), for the caveats in Lister's speech
referring to the effect of family structure versus other parental characteristics on school
achievement.
84. See Lister, supra note 80.
85. Iris Marion Young, Mothers, Citizenship, and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family
Values, 105 ETHics 535, 545 (1995).
86. Pepper Schwartz, Gender and the Liberal Family, RESPONSIVE COMMUNTrY, Spring
1991, at 86, 87.
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I wholeheartedly agree with the social scientists and feminists
who critique the civil societarian perspective. Those who are
skeptical about the predictive value of the "science" underlying
claims for the superiority of the two-parent family have a basis for
that skepticism. Conflicting evidence about the success of single
parent families, as well as inconvenient evidence about the
shortcomings of traditional families, seems to get lost in the civil
societarian's smooth transition from observing the need for action to
help children, to laying blame on parents living in nontraditional
family forms.
The feminist critics are also correct to point out that marriage
remains a gendered institution-one in which wives, rather than
husbands, carry the largest share of the burdens associated with
intimacy and child careY For some women, reproduction outside of
the marital family may just be easier than having to cope with the
vestiges of patriarchal privilege shaping the expectations and
demands of their husbands, in addition to caring for children and
working. For others, it is not even a choice in this sense. Further,
civil societarians should remember that their vision of the marriage
relationship as benign and beneficial is not always the experience of
women. Abuse and violence within the institution remains a real
concern for many women.18
Rather than reiterating and elaborating upon insights already
eloquently presented by others, I want to turn to a different set of
questions and concerns about the role of the family in civil society
debates. Specifically, I want to question the lack of attention to the
effects of other societal institutions on the family. My perspective is
that those concerned with the health of civil society and our nation
should focus on the pressures placed on the institution of the family
(however defined) by significant trends or changes in the nonfamily
institutions of society, particularly those in the business or market
sector. The pressures generated by uncontrolled market institutions
are at least as relevant to the health and well-being of children and
families as are uncontrolled mothers and fathers. The irresponsibility
of the state in not regulating or mediating the excesses of market
activities is at least as devastating to a child as the presumed
irresponsibility of any unwed or divorced parent. We must count the
87. See Young, supra note 85, at 545.
88. See generally the discussion on domestic violence and child custody in KATHERINE T.
BARTLETt & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCrRINE, COMMENTARY
570-72 (2d ed. 1998).
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costs to the family and, hence, to civil society of increased income
disparity,89 wage stagnation for middle and lower income wage
earners, 90 and persistent impoverishment for too many of our nation's
children.91
THE UNCONTROLLED MARKET AND THE UNRESPONSIVE STATE
Interestingly, the Council on Civil Society initially identified
"growing inequality" as a primary condition endangering "the very
possibility of continuing self-governance." 92  In fact, the nation's
current predicament was cast as "growing inequality, surrounded and
partly driven by moral meltdown. '93 The recognition that there is
growing inequality, and that it is critically relevant to assessing the
decline in civil society, was ultimately (and quickly) overshadowed by
the Council's identification of morality as the paramount concern.
Once again, survey data proved valuable in shifting the discussion to
morality. The Council cited an opinion poll finding that "[b]y a
margin of 59 percent to 27 percent, Americans believe that 'lack of
morality' is a greater problem in the United States than 'lack of
economic opportunity."' 94
Whatever the Americans answering the survey might have meant
in giving their responses, the Council on Civil Society followed the
civil societarian traditional litany-the problem is moral meltdown
and that can be traced to the broken "cradle of citizenship": the
family.95  The implications and effects of inequality were left
unexplored.
But I think there is a strong argument to be made that growing
inequality does have implications for civil society and should be
central in the debates. In order to begin that argument, it is
productive to map the growth in inequality on the same grid as the
Commission on Civic Renewal used in constructing its Index of
89. See DANIEL H. WEINBERG, A BRIEF LOOK AT POSTWAR U.S. INCOME INEQUALITY 1
(U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports P60-191, 1996); Rodger Doyle, Income
Inequality in the U.S., SCI. AM., June 1999, at 26, 26-27.
90. See URE BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., THE STATE OF AMERICANS: THIS GENERATION
AND THE NEXT 56-57 (1996).
91. See Eugene M. Lewit et al., Children and Poverty: Analysis and Recommendations,
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN & POVERTY, Summer/Fall 1997, at 4,5,7.
92. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 4. Perhaps this attention to inequality
reflects the fact that one of the Council's sponsors is the University of Chicago Divinity School.
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 7.
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National Civic Health. The Commission selected the period from
1974 to 1996 as the relevant time frame for measurement of those
things it considered relevant-falling political participation, decline of
political and social trust, falling membership in organizations, and
youth crime rates.96
During that same period of time, there has been significant,
growing inequality in income distribution in the United States, as well
as a general decline in wages for many Americans.97 Further, there
has been a contraction of responsibility for provision of basic social
goods, such as insurance by market institutions, and a withdrawal of
entitlements to federal welfare benefits.98 These changes have had a
tremendous impact on the well-being of families and children. In
fact, inequality may be more central to understanding the other
designated indicators of decline than either the rising divorce rate or
the increase in never-married motherhood (factors that the
Commission identified as the relevant variables in the Family
Component of its Index).99
INCOME INEQUALITY AND WAGE STAGNATION
Prior to the early 1970s, the United States was becoming
"progressively more egalitarian."10° Since that time, however, the
reverse has been true, with income inequality "reaching its 1947 level
in 1982 and increasing further since then."'10 1 The Gini Index
measures income concentration "ranges from 0.0, when every family
(household) has the same income, to 1.0, when one family
(household) has all the income," thus projecting "how far a given
income distribution is from equality."1 2  The increase in income
inequality was 22.4% from 1968 to 1994.103 Another way to state the
same phenomena is to observe that in 1968, the household at the
ninety-fifth percentile had 6.0 times the income of the household at
the twentieth percentile, while in 1994, that had jumped to 8.2 times
96. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON Civic RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 24.
97. See BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 90, at 56-57; WEINBERG, supra note 89, at 1;
Doyle, supra note 89, at 26-27.
98. See Kathryn Larin & Elizabeth McNichol, Pulling Apart: A State-by-State Analysis of
Income Trends (visited Dec. 16, 1997) <http://www.cbpp.org/pa-4.htm>.
99. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 2, at 24.
100. Doyle, supra note 89, at 26.
101. WEINBERG, supra note 89, at 1.
102. Id. at 1 n.1.
103. See id. at 1.
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the income.104
There are varied reasons contributing to this increase in
inequality. Of particular interest are those associated with business
practices and those resulting from state and national governmental
policies. In regard to market institutions, commonly mentioned
factors contributing to inequality include the globalization of trade,
the decline of trade unions, the drop in good-paying manufacturing
jobs, and the growing earnings advantage of better-educated
workers. 08 Governmental policies, particularly the lowered tax rates
introduced by the Reagan administration, are also typically targeted
as contributing to inequality.106 Income inequality is greater in the
United States than in Europe, where globalization and technology
also affected the distribution of income.10 7 European countries have
stronger labor union movements and more welfare state benefits,
which moderated the growth of inequality.10 8
In addition and related to income inequality is the fact that, as a
whole, wages have decreased since 1973. In his book, The State of
Americans: This Generation and the Next, Urie Bronfenbrenner
reports that between 1973 and 1994, weekly wages decreased 18.8%
and hourly wages decreased 13.5%, while hourly compensation
increased slightly by 7.6%. 109 Family income has been falling slowly
since the 1970s; between 1973 and 1992, a family's inflation-adjusted
median income has decreased by 1.5% overall. 1'0 Relative incomes
for the poorest are decreasing, and even the richest 5% in the country
only saw their incomes rise by 1.16% between 1973 and 1992 as an
average annual percent change."'
Education and change in the nature of jobs explain the high-
density income disparity.1 2 "In 1979, the average college graduate
earned 38 percent more than the average high school graduate.""13 In
104. See id. at 2. "A parallel way to look at this change examines" the growth in average
household income in each quintile-Xfrom $73,754 in 1968 to... $105,945 in 1994" (44%) for
the top quintile but only from $7202 to $7762 (7%) for those in the bottom quintile. Id.
105. See Doyle, supra note 89, at 26-27.
106. See id. at 27.
107. See id.
10& See id.
109. BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., supra note 90, at 56.
110. See id. at 58.
111. See id. at 61.
112. Poverty may be increasing because of the change from blue-collar to white-collar jobs
that took place between the 1970s and 1980s, a change from which workers have not completely
recovered. See CAPLOW, supra note 57, at 87.
113. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Futurework: Trends and Challenges for Work in the 21st Century,
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1999, the average college graduate earned seventy-one percent more
than the average high school graduate, thus increasing income
disparity.14 Even in industries where there is growth, such as high-
technology, there are very few or no opportunities for the low-skilled
factory worker, who is increasingly sliding toward poverty.115 Yet a
college education is not guaranteed to all who could benefit in the
United States because education is more expensive, and therefore less
accessible, than it is in other post-industrial countries.
In addition, organizations that traditionally fought for higher
wages, such as labor unions, are no longer as powerful as several
decades ago.116 Seventeen percent of workers were unionized in 1987,
compared to twenty-five percent in 1975.1 7 In addition, unionization
predominantly exists in only three industries: government,
transportation, and utilities.18  Statistics such as these suggest that
lower wages and less economic stability are the problem for the
American family, not family structure.
INEQUALITY AND THE FAMILY
What happens to families (regardless of form) whose economic
well-being is threatened? Families are entering poverty at larger
rates. In 1977, 7.7% of families were under the poverty line. 1 9 In
1993, 11.4% of the families were below the poverty line.'20 Even in an
era of strong economic growth, poverty persists.'2' Of particular
concern are the children. "In recent years, about one in five
American children" (twelve to fourteen million) have lived in families
with cash income flow below the poverty line.12 "The United States
is the only Western industrialized nation that does not have some




116. See CAPLOW, supra note 57, at 90.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See BRONFENBRENNER ET AL, supra note 90, at 66.
120. See id.
121. A recent article in the New York Times detailed how the poverty rate in New York
City persisted despite the strongest economy in years. Nearly one in four New York City
residents had incomes below the poverty threshold in 1998. See Nina Bernstein, Poverty Rate
Persists in City Despite Boom: It Is Double the Average for U.S., Analysis Finds, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 1999, at B1.
122. See Jeanne Brooks-Gunn & Greg J. Duncan, The Effects of Poverty on Children,
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN & POVERTY, Summer/Fall 1997, at 55,55.
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form of universal cash benefit for families raising children."'123 In
addition, child poverty rates are higher in the United States than in
sixteen other industrialized countries.124 There are both short and
long-term consequences for children. Evidence supports the
conclusion that family income can substantially influence child and
adolescent well-being, specifically their physical health, cognitive
ability, school achievement, emotional and behavioral outcomes, and
teenage out-of-wedlock childbearing. 125
Even in families well above the poverty line, falling economic
fortunes create a scramble to stay ahead. Wage and job instability
produces stress, encourages longer hours, and necessitates the
participation of more family members in the workplace. In this
regard, it is interesting that although families are entering poverty at
increasing rates, more married women with young children are
entering the labor force.126 In 1970, thirty percent of married women
with young children were in the labor force.127 In 1987, fifty-seven
percent of married women with young children were in the labor
force, and that number has continued to increase.:E
Reporting on a study by Ellen Galinsky of the Families and
Work Institute, the Washington Post indicated that children's
interaction with their parents is affected by parental job-related
stress. 29 Further, economic necessity means that both parents are
working longer hours-over the last two decades American fathers'
time at work increased by 3.1 hours per week while mothers added
5.2 hours.1' ° "Employed fathers with children younger than 18 now
work an average of 50.9 hours per week; working mothers, 41.4
123. Lewit et al., supra note 91, at 14.
124. See id. at 11.
125. See Brooks-Gunn & Duncan, supra note 122, at 57. This report collects and assesses
the available research in regard to each of these dimensions on the well-being of children in
poverty. The authors conclude that the evidence supports the conclusion that income can
substantially influence children's well-being, finding that the associations between income and
child outcomes are more complex and varied than suggested in simple tables. "Family income
seems to be more strongly related to children's ability and achievement-related outcomes than
to emotional outcomes. In addition, the effects are particularly pronounced for children who
live below the poverty line for multiple years and for children who live in extreme poverty ....
Id. at 67-68.
126. See CAPLOW, supra note 57, at 58-59.
127. See id. at 59.
12& See id. Even two parent families are experiencing poverty, so revering the two-parent
family as an ideal economic unit is not the answer.
129. Kirstin Downey Grimsley & Jacqueline L. Salmon, For Working Parents, Mixed News




hours."' 131 "Americans... surpass every other industrialized nation in
time spent on the job ... putting in the equivalent of two weeks more
per year than the Japanese.' 1 32 In addition to having a negative effect
on parent-child interaction, this increase in hours and the stress it
generates affects the marital relationship 133 and leaves little time or
energy for participation in voluntary civic activities. Perhaps the real
danger to civic society is the runaway nature of contemporary
American capitalism and the inequities it has generated.
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES
It is also important to note that "federal and state policies have,
in many cases, accelerated rather than moderated" the trend toward
greater income inequality.34 Policy decisions affecting both benefit
programs and tax systems have tended to widen existing gaps in
distribution of income. 135
Enactment of a higher minimum wage could help to reverse or
moderate the decline in wages.136 Bouts of unemployment tend to
plague workers at the lower end of the pay scale resulting in the
decrease of incomes.137  Unemployment insurance, as part of the
governmental safety net for workers, has become less effective in
recent years.138 A smaller share of unemployed workers now receive
benefits. 139 In 1995, just one in three was covered. By contrast, prior
to 1980 the percent covered exceeded forty percent.' 4°
Income support programs have also suffered. Over the period
from the late-1970s to the mid-1990s, benefits provided through Aid
For Families With Dependent Children ("AFDC") fell in the
131. Id.
132 Id.
133. A recent study by Cornell sociologist, Phyllis Moen, reports that couples who feel
burdened by their working hours, with very demanding jobs and a conflict between work and
personal life, report lowest quality of life among working couples surveyed. See Working
Couples Burdened by Time at Work Say Their Lives Are Beset by Stress, Conflict and Overload,
Cornell Sociologist Reports, CORNELL U. NEWS, Jan. 22, 1999 (visited Mar. 6, 2000) <http://
www.news.cornell.edu/releases/Jan99/AAAS.couples.strategies.html>.






140. See id. The reason for the shrinkage is both the decline of manufacturing jobs and the
changes in policies on the part of national and state governments. See id.
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too exhausted and busy to participate.'-5 Ehrenberg, referencing
William Julius Wilson, further notes that there seems to be an
association between lack of work and the disappearing civil society."'
AN ALTERNATIVE VISION-THE FAMILY AS A "PUBLIC"
INSTITUTION
The real danger of the civil societarian's narrow focus on family
form is that it will deflect attention away from the more serious
problems that the current political and economic contexts present for
the family. Many different types of families succeed very well at their
societal task. What does seem clear, however, is that a certain level of
resources are necessary to accomplish that task and that, in recent
years, these resources have become less available to many families.
This is not the fault of the families, but is the result of changes in
attitude and scope of governmental safeguards, as well as market
practices. How should society respond to these changes? Focusing
on family form will not even lead us to the right questions to begin to
make coherent policy that will help our families.
In recent work, I have been rethinking the arrangement between
family and state by articulating a theory of collective responsibility for
dependency. The objective is to make an argument for the
redistribution of responsibility for dependency among what I call the
"coercive institutions" of family, state, and market. 15 2 Our current
(and historic) stated national ideology glorifies self-sufficiency and
independence, both for the individual and for the family. Within this
ideology, the primary responsibility for the developmental or
physiological dependence of children and some elderly, disabled or ill
persons, what I have previously labeled "inevitable dependency," is
placed on the family. 15 3 Dependency, which is seen, at least partially,
in many other systems as a collective responsibility, is privatized in
our system through the institution of the family. In our late capitalist
system, the state is perceived as having a role only in the case of
family default. In such instances, this state might provide highly
stigmatized assistance (welfare) for those "deviant" families unable to
150. See id.
151. See id. at 247.
152. I use the term "coercive" to distinguish these highly regulated, legally defined
institutions from more voluntary social structures such as philanthropy, religion, or charity.
153. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 161-63 (1995).
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majority of states, typically forty percent for a family of three.141
Things did get worse, however. The Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunities Act of 1996 allows the elimination of benefits for
families who do not conform to training and work requirements, as
well as sets time limits on the eligibility for assistance.142 In Children
and Poverty: Analysis and Recommendations, the Center for the
Future of Children reports that child poverty rates for the United
States are higher than rates in sixteen other countries and concludes
that 1996 "reform" jeopardizes the safety net for poor children by
replacing AFDC with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, a
new program whose benefits are time-limited, and by reducing food
stamp benefits for families with children.143
Tax policy also has played a role in widening income disparity.
During the 1990s many states made their tax systems less
progressive.'" Tax reductions in recent years have been targeted
toward higher-income families.145 The major taxes paid by upper-
income families are personal income taxes and capital gains, which
have both been lowered in the past several years. 1 But states have
not reversed the increases in sales and excise taxes, which are the
most burdensome taxes for lower-income families. 147
• ECONOMICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Stagnant wages and income inequality are major factors
contributing to a diminished American dream.1  The experience of
inequality must certainly contribute to suspicion and mistrust on the
part of those who see others getting further and further ahead.
Inability to provide one's children with minimal goods and services
can lead to frustration and despair. John Ehrenberg, in his new book
on the civil society, comments on the series of articles by Sara Rimer
in the New York Times in which she investigated the effects of the
"downsizing of America" on community life. 49 Rimer found people
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See Lewit et al., supra note 91, at 13.




148. See Richard K. Caputo, Economic Well-Being in a Youth Cohort, FAM. Soc'y: J.
CoNTEMP. HUM. SERVICES, Jan. 1, 1998, at 83.
149. JOHN EHRENBERG, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA 246 (1999).
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provide for their members' needs' 4 Market institutions have few, if
any, direct responsibility for the family, even for the families of their
own workers.
My argument is that a more appropriate and equitable scheme
would more evenly distribute the burdens for inevitable dependency,
with the market as well as the state assuming some up-front share of
the economic and social costs (the subsidy) inherent in the
reproduction of society. There is also a need for structural changes
and institutional accommodation of the demands of caretaking. I
articulate this claim as a "right," based on the argument that
caretaking is societal-preserving and perpetuating work. Dependency
work produces things of benefit to society in general. It is the labor
that generates citizens and workers, consumers and voters. As things
are now structured, the costs of doing dependency work are hidden in
the family where, due to gendered role divisions, they are borne
primarily by women. Further, this caretaking labor, which is
performed for the good of the society, has individual costs for
caretakers who often find themselves sacrificing career development,
forgoing economic opportunities, and becoming derivatively
dependent upon others for resources in order to accomplish their
tasks.15
" How should the need for resources for caretaking be
satisfied so caretakers can act independently, make
decisions, and fulfill societal expectations in ways that
best respond to their individual circumstances?
" Should caretakers be primarily dependent on the family
in this regard?
* Given the tenuous status of marriage in this society
(where the divorce rate continues to hover around fifty
percent 56 and women are expected to be wage earners as
well as wives and mothers)57 how can we continue to
have a traditional model of the family served up by
politicians as the solution for poverty?
154. For a fuller account of this theory, see M. L .A. Fineman, Cracking Our Foundational
Myths: Independence, Autonomy and Self-Sufficiency, AM. U. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming,
manuscript on file with the author). Note here also, with the end of entitlement for families in
need represented by welfare reform, the state "might" respond.
155. See id. for an extended discussion of derivative dependency and its effects.
156. See LUGALIA, supra note 55, at 8.
157. See CAPLOW, supra note 57, at 59 (showing the increase of married women with young
children in the workforce).
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* Should not the richest country in the history of the world
have a family policy that goes beyond marriage as the
solution for dependency?
" Specifically, does not the family as it exists today require
substantial assistance from other societal institutions?
* Is it fair that the market and the state (which are totally
dependent on caretaking labor and in no way self-
sufficient or independent from caretaking) escape
responsibility for dependency and continue to be
freeloaders (or free riders) on the backs of caretakers and
families?
" Is not it time to redistribute some responsibility for
dependency and mandate that the state and market bear
their fair share of the burden?
These are the questions to which I would urge the civil
societarians turn their attention. The problem with society is not that
marriage is in trouble. The real crisis is that we expect marriage to be
able to compensate for the inequality created by our other
institutions.
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